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The present work aims to describe the 
main results obtained from the neuroimag-
ing studies on the study of those cognitive 
processes related to imaging and imagina-
tion. A brief excursus on the development 
of modern neuroimaging techniques pres-
ents the methodological background of the 
many studies. The relationship between 
sight, blindness and conceptual represen-
tation is explored. Research has shown 
that the ventro-temporal cortex is respon-
sible for recognizing the surrounding en-
vironment, to distinguish an object from 
a face and, in general, objects’ categoriza-
tion. This area is responsible of imagery 
in both sighted and blind people, being its 
morpho-functional organization indepen-
dent of the visual experience. It follows 
that a very precise classification of all 
categories of objects could be obtained 
in the human brain, and it is supported 
by a distributed cortical representation 
independent from the sensorial modal-
ity. The last part of the paper presents 
a series of studies, in which the study of 
imagery was related to aggressivity. The 
prefrontal cortex is deactivated when an 
individual imagines himself becoming ag-
gressive, being this effect more relevant 
in females than in males. As a conclusion, 
the neuroscientific approach produced 
important results in the definition of what 
imagery is, and showed its relevance to 
the study of how mind and brain work. 
IMAGING BRAIN ANATOMY
SUPRAMODALITY
VISUAL IMAGERY
CONCEPTUAL REPRESENTATION
AGGRESSIVITY
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The interest in brain morphology is old, so as the interest 
about how the conscious life, mental activity and cognitive 
functions could emerge from the brain structures. Andrea 
Vesalio, known as the founder of modern anatomy, wrote in 
the famous text “De Humanis corporis Fabrica”, in 1543: “Non 
nego che i ventricoli elaborino lo spirito animale, ma sostengo che 
questo non spiega nulla sulla sede cerebrale delle facoltà più el-
evate dello spirito. (...) Non sono in grado di comprendere come il 
cervello possa esercitare le sue funzioni”. (*)
Before the development of modern methods for the mor-
phological and functional exploration of the central nervous 
system, in the mid-eighties of the last century, the studies on the 
brain focused on the observation of individuals, who had suffered 
from injuries.  The first descriptions of serious personality and 
behavioral disorders, due to a brain injury, appeared in an-
cient times. One should think of the famous case of Phineas 
Gage described by the doctor John Martin Harlow in 1848 
(Harlow, 1848). Gage served as a foreman in the construction 
of the railway line in Windsor County, Vermont. One morning 
he was victim of an accident at work, following the accidental 
triggering of an explosive charge. Gage was struck by an iron 
bar that penetrated the left cheek, pierced the skull, and came 
out of the frontal top. The Gage case has remained in the his-
tory of neuroscience, neurology, and psychiatry, not only be-
cause Gage was miraculously able to survive, but also because 
his character and personality changed radically, so that ac-
quaintances concluded that “Phineas was no longer himself”.
It was soon realized that some fundamental func-
tions were lacking in patients, who had suffered from le-
sions in the frontal lobes, like that of Gage. In fact, such le-
sions produce an unusual range of emotional, cognitive 
and behavioral changes. With the development of modern 
methods for morphological and functional in vivo brain 
exploration (such as positron emission tomography [PET], 
structural magnetic resonance [MRI] and functional mag-
netic resonance [fMRI]), it was possible to study the fine 
anatomical and functional architecture underlying the sev-
PIETRINI
37www.img-network.it
eral cognitive activities and the most complex and elusive 
mental functions. For example, emotional experience, be-
havioral control, abstract thinking, moral judgment, plan-
ning skills, programming, the distinction between good and 
evil, respect for norms, and social conventions (Koechlin et 
al., 2000; Nichelli et al., 1994; Pietrini, 2003; Raichle, 1994).
In their entirety, the results of neuroscientific research 
show how these sophisticated mental functions can be 
linked to the activity of precise brain structures, mainly 
located in the frontal lobe. By comparing the develop-
ment and organization of the cerebral cortex in the hu-
man brain and brains of animals phylogenetically close 
to man (such as monkeys), we can see how the prefron-
tal cortex developed much more in the human brain.
Therefore, through the study the cerebral correlates of 
certain functions (such as abstract thought, moral judgment, 
the conceptual representation of the external world, and so 
on), we understand that the human being is the best, if not 
the only, animal model to be considered. In ancient Greek 
language, the verb “to know” oἶδα (pronounced “oida”) was 
the perfect tense of a verb that indicated the act of seeing 
(cf. ὁράω, pronounced “orao”), and meant “I saw, and there-
fore I know”. It also indicates that knowledge could not be 
independent from the visual experience. Even today, the 
relevance of sight is indicated by the frequent use of terms 
based on visual verbs: “Can you see my point?”, “I see what 
you mean”, “Vedere la vita in rosa”, “Stravedere per qualcuno”, “Ar-
rivederci”, and so on. (**)
From a neurophysiological point of view, the relevance of 
sight is in agreement with the finding that the cerebral cor-
tex related to visual functions represents almost a third of 
the entire surface of the cerebral cortex. 
These first considerations give rise to a spontaneous se-
ries of questions, not only from a neuroscientific point of 
view. How can people with congenital blindness represent 
a world they have never seen? How do they use brain struc-
tures dedicated to vision in the absence of sight? And, again, 
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to what extent is sight really necessary for the brain to devel-
op its wonderful morphological and functional architecture? 
Finally, what can we learn from the study of the brain of blind 
individuals, about how the brain develops and functions in 
physiological conditions? Thanks to modern methods of in 
vivo exploration of brain functioning, we can look for the 
answer to these questions. In particular, through functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), a non-invasive biomed-
ical imagining technique, we can observe the brain at work 
and obtain a map of functionally informative brain areas.
Through functional magnetic resonance experiments, we 
were able to outline the functional topography of the visual 
pathways in humans. After that the stimulus reaches the pri-
mary visual cortex, it is split into two parts. One part proceeds 
on the ventral way, also called the “what pathway”, though 
which we recognize the external world. The other part pro-
ceeds on the dorsal way, also called the “where pathway”, 
which is the one allowing us to place objects in space (Haxby 
et al., 1994). Consequently, if we want to move in the surround-
ing world, these two areas of the brain must necessarily talk 
intensely with each other, to be able to recognize the objects 
around us and place them in the space. In some diseases, e.g., 
the Alzheimer’s disease, the ability of different areas of the ce-
rebral cortex to communicate with each other is lost even be-
fore that focal alterations (that is, to parts of the cortex) occur. 
This is also known as an alteration of functional connectivity 
(Grady et al., 2001; Pietrini et al., 1993; Pietrini et al, 2009a).
The ventro-temporal cortex (a small part of the cerebral 
cortex formed by the ventral part of the temporal lobe) allows 
us to recognize everything that surrounds us, and to distin-
guish an object from a face as well as different categories of 
objects between them. This topic has always fascinated the 
world of neuroscience, psychology, and cognitive sciences.
In a study published in 2001 (Haxby et al., 2001), we used 
three Tesla magnetic resonance imaging to understand the 
neural correlates for recognizing different categories of ob-
jects. We examined brain activity in response to visual rec-
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ognition of objects belonging to different categories: faces, 
animals, artificial tools, chairs, places, and everyday objects.
The results demonstrate that the brain response is dis-
tributed throughout the entire ventro-temporal cortex, in a 
largely overlapping manner for all the categories examined. 
However, the pattern of brain response appears to be highly 
specific for each category, so much that we can predict, with 
great accuracy, what the subject is looking at. In other words, 
there is a very strong correlation in the response within the 
same category. That is, the response that the brain provides 
when we look at a face is significantly correlated within the 
category of faces, but it is not correlated with the response ob-
tained with brain activity related to other categories. There-
fore, we can state the existence of a categorical specificity.
The study by Haxby and colleagues (2001) led to the de-
velopment of a new model called Object Form Topography. 
According to this model, the ventral-temporal cerebral cortex 
does not respond in an all-or-nothing way to certain categories 
of objects. Rather, it can produce an infinite series of specific 
patterns of neuronal response. As mentioned above, these 
patterns are particularly specific and can predict what the in-
dividual is looking at. To our knowledge, this is the first study 
of Brain Reading, addressed to decode a neural signal in such 
a specific way to be only referable to a specific mental activity.
At this point, a question arises about the conceptual repre-
sentation: is the functional organization of the cortex only vi-
sual or does it represent a more abstract representation of the 
external world? To test this hypothesis, we conducted a series 
of functional magnetic resonance studies, in which subjects 
were blindfolded and were required to recognize objects of 
different categories, though the tactile (not visual) modality.
Subjects had to perceive objects with their own hands, 
for example, by touching casts of human faces or other 
types of objects, such as shoes or bottles. The tactile ex-
ploration showed a strong activation, not only of the so-
matosensory cortex, but also of the ventro-temporal visual 
cortex, congruently with what happens for visual recogni-
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tion. If we superimpose and compare areas activated dur-
ing visual recognition and those during tactile recognition 
(Figure 1), we realize that there are areas of the ventro-
temporal visual cortex that are activated in both cases. 
Several studies show that there is not big difference for 
the brain between seeing something concretely or imagining 
to seeing it (Pearson et al., 2015). It follows that, if we touch 
an object and explore it with our touch, we immediately 
evoke the visual image of the object that we are touching: 
this process is called visual imagery (Cattaneo et al., 2008).
How can we, therefore, exclude that this activation in 
the ventral-temporal cortex during tactile exploration is not 
simply due to visual imagery? To provide an answer to this 
question, we asked people with congenital blindness - who 
have never seen the world around them and therefore do 
not have a conceptual representation coming from a visual 
experience - to recognize objects through tactile exploration.
As shown in Figure 2, the visual cortex of these subjects 
is activated in the same way and with the same categorical 
specificity as in the sighted persons, when they see or touch 
the same object. Given that the congenital blind person has 
no visual experience and, therefore, no visual imagery, we 
can reasonably assume that the ventro-temporal cortical ac-
tivation, occurring during the tactile recognition of different 
categories of objects, cannot be attributed merely to visual 
imagery (Pietrini et al., 2004).Therefore, the morpho-func-
tional organization of the ventro-temporal cortex is indepen-
Fig. 1 The figure shows the 
areas of the ventral-temporal 
cortex activated in response to 
the visual perception (in green) 
or tactile (in red) of different 
categories of objects. The areas 
of the cortex that are activated 
in response to both visual and 
tactile perception are reported 
in yellow (from Pietrini et al., 
PNAS, 2004, modified).
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dent of the visual experience. This property has been defined 
as supramodality, which is the ability to process perceptual 
information independently from a specific sensory modality 
(Pietrini et al., 2009b; Ricciardi et al., 2014). Thus, from per-
ception, we move to what could be defined as a conceptual 
representation. How are concepts related to our surrounding 
space coded in the brain? We run an experiment in collabo-
ration with scientists on neurolinguistics of the University of 
Pisa, in which sighted as well as blind from birth individuals 
were asked to describe the characteristics of different objects. 
Objects belonged to different categories as mammals, birds, 
fruits, vegetables, tools, vehicles, natural places, and artificial 
places.Through a verbal description, it is possible to recon-
struct some maps of conceptual representation that group ob-
jects together using a property-generation task. These maps 
are called “behavioral representational similarity maps”. The 
experiment required that sighted subjects read the name of 
the referenced object (Verbal Visual Form) or see the image 
projected (Pictorial Visual Form), or even listen to the name 
of the referenced object (Verbal Auditory Form). In a time 
frame of seven seconds, sighted subjects verbally described 
what they saw or listened to (for example: pineapple: it is a 
fruit, it is sweet, etc.; cat: is a mammal, meows, has a tail, etc.; 
bar: it’s a place where you get together, they serve coffee; and 
so on). Obviously, only the acoustic mode was used for blind 
subjects, by listening to the name of the referenced object.
These experiments highlighted the link between the spa-
tial representation of the different categories of objects - ob-
tained through the verbalization of the categories - and the 
possibility of reconstructing the conceptual maps of the ob-
jects - based on the patterns of cerebral activation. If we then 
analyze the whole brain, instead of the visual cortex only, 
both the correlation and a notable improvement in the seg-
regation between the different objects occurs. Then, a very 
precise classification of all categories of objects (separated 
from each other) could be obtained when all the areas that 
cooperate to this classification are included in the analysis. 
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Fig. 2 The figure shows the 
areas of the ventral-temporal 
cortex activated in response to 
tactile perception in visually 
impaired (above) and blind 
subjects from birth (below). 
The arrow indicates the areas 
of the “visual” ventral-temporal 
cortex activated by the tactile 
perception in the blind subjects 
from birth (from Pietrini et al., 
PNAS, 2004, modified).
This shows that the conceptual representation of an object of 
a given category in the human brain is supported by a distrib-
uted cortical representation independent from the sensorial 
modality, which does not differ significantly between those 
who had a visual experience and those who had not. This rep-
resentation is also independent from the visual experience 
and the sensory modality used to collect the information 
(Handjaras et al, 2016, 2017).
The existence of functional cortical organization, more 
abstract than what was expected, shows how the brain is pro-
grammed to develop independently from the visual experi-
ence. It is not yet known how much the brain is genetically 
programmed and how much it depends on stimuli from the 
environment, although it is highly probable that the brain 
needs some sensorial experience, anyway. Such an organiza-
tion allows individuals who are blind from birth to acquire 
knowledge, to create mental representations, to learn from 
others and to actually interact with an external world, which 
they have never seen (Ricciardi and Pietrini, 2011). Thus, the 
brain can develop its anatomical and functional architecture 
independently from the visual experience. This can be con-
sidered a clear advantage also from an evolutionary point 
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of view. After the discussion about perception, and after the 
definition of conceptual representation, it is now time to 
present the concept of Imagery.
IMAGES, IMAGERY AND IMAGINATION. CAN THE BRAIN 
IMAGINE BECOMING AGGRESSIVE?
 
Using the recent methodologies of morphological 
and functional exploration of the central nervous system, 
we can wonder, for example, what happens in our brain 
when we make a decision, when we interact with others, 
when we respond to the outside world, or when we be-
come aggressive. From a neurobiological and evolution-
ary point of view, aggression is the implementation of a 
behavioral response aimed at benefiting the individual.
A few years ago, we investigated what happens in the 
brains of healthy young people, who do not have behav-
ioral disorders or a history of violence, when they are asked 
to imagine themselves in a situation where they must ex-
press aggression. Healthy individuals, subjected to Positron 
Emission Tomography (PET), with marked water to mea-
sure changes in cerebral blood flow 1, had to imagine being 
in a confined environment (an elevator) with their mother, 
along with two strangers. On a certain moment, one of the 
two strangers assaulted the subject’s mother, in different 
scenarios. The subjects had to react thinking to attack this 
person and beat her, even to the point of killing her (Pietri-
ni et al., 2000). The results of the study showed how, when 
the individual imagines himself becoming aggressive, his 
prefrontal cortex is functionally inhibited, in a sort of func-
tional shutdown, that is, deactivated with respect to emo-
tionally neutral conditions. Furthermore, this deactivation 
was much more significant in females than in males, prob-
ably because imagining physical violence is an even more 
unnatural act for a female than it is for a male. This is con-
gruent to the finding that the scores of aptitude for violence 
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are significantly greater in males than in females (Figure 3).
These in vivo functional data, in agreement with the 
evidence of clinical literature, demonstrate the importance 
of the prefrontal cortex in the modulation of aggressive be-
havior and, more generally, of social behavior and impulse 
control. The definition of functional neuroanatomy, which 
underlies the control of behavior, opens the perspective to 
the study of the brain correlates of criminal behavior. How 
much is the criminal really free? Or, is that person a criminal 
because he or she cannot be different from what he or she is 
(as also summarized in the word game “Bad or Mad” in An-
glo-Saxon literature)?
More than a hundred years ago, the English psychiatrist 
Henry Maudsley (1835-1918), describing criminal psycho-
paths, wrote: “As there are people who cannot distinguish 
certain colors by having what is called color blindness, and 
others who have no ear for music cannot distinguish one 
musical tone from another, in the same way, there are some 
that are congenitally lacking of any moral sense”. This is a 
statement made many years before the advent of any meth-
odology for the scientific investigation of the central ner-
vous system. With the modern methods available, we could 
nowadays compare healthy non-psychopathic subjects with 
psychopathic criminals, and we are able to detect the pres-
ence of selective anatomical brain differences between the 
two groups of subjects (Figure 4).
In fact, there is a neuronal reduction that does not con-
cern the whole brain but is only concentrated in the prefron-
tal cortex and in some areas of the limbic system. It is well 
known that the prefrontal cortex is important to the control 
of aggressive behavior and the limbic system to emotional-
affective regulation (Ermer et al., 2012). This difference re-
mains statistically significant even when all the possible 
confounding factors have been taken into consideration, for 
example: the level of education, psychiatric history, head 
injuries, alcohol, drug abuse, and so on. Hence, the psycho-
pathic criminals have a prefrontal cortex with significantly 
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reduced thickness, nerve cells population (over 20% fewer 
neurons) with respect to control subjects, and with an altered 
functional connectivity (Ermer et al., 2012; Anderson & Kiehl, 
2012; Ly et al., 2012). However, this observation does not tell 
us whether a) these individuals behave this way because 
they are criminals, or b) they are criminals because they are 
like that. In other words, we are faced with the famous egg-
chicken dilemma. To understand what is the cause and what 
is the effect, longitudinal studies are needed on large groups 
of subjects, starting from the stages of early adolescence. It 
would be even better to combine these studies with studies 
on genetic factors that modulate a) vulnerability to the envi-
ronment in childhood and b) the risk of developing antisocial 
behavior in adults (Byrd & Manuck, 2014; Caspi et al., 2002; 
Iofrida et al., 2014 ; Pietrini & Rota, 2013; Rota et al., 2014).
As a conclusion, the long journey in the Imaging Brain 
Anatomy has begun many years ago with the anatomical 
studies, in which Italy has been at the forefront. Then, it con-
tinued with the possibility to study in vivo neuroanatomy with 
high-resolution, achieving the step of overlapping structure 
Fig. 3 The figure shows the 
reduction in work (in blue) 
in the areas of the prefrontal 
cortex of healthy subjects 
during the expression of 
aggressive behavior at the 
imaginary level (from Pietrini 
et al., PNAS, 2004, modified)
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and function. Nowadays, it is possible to examine the brain 
in action while we perceive a figure, represent its meaning, 
plan a strategy, decide between good and evil. This is a fasci-
nating journey into the brain, in search of the mind. Still, in 
the hope, which we all look for, of being able to find the crux 
of the matter about the complexity of the phenomena occur-
ring in our brain (Pietrini, 2003).
Fig. 4 The figure shows the 
areas of the cerebral cortex 
with a significant reduction in 
neuronal density (in blue) in a 
group of psychopathic criminals 
concerning healthy control 
subjects (from Ermer et al., 2012, 
modified).
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